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When Is Religious Speech Outrageous?:
Snyder v. Phelps and the Limits of Religious
Advocacy
Jeffrey Shulman*
The Constitution affords great protection to religiously motivated
speech. Religious liberty would mean little if it did not mean the right to
profess and practice as well as to believe. But are there limits beyond
which religious speech loses its constitutional shield? Would it violate
the First Amendment to subject a religious entity to tort liability if its religious profession causes emotional distress? When is religious speech
outrageous?
These are vexing questions, to say the least; but the United States
Supreme Court will take them up next term—and it will do so in a factual context that has generated as much heat as light. On March 8, 2010,
the Court granted certiorari in Snyder v. Phelps.1 It is a tort case brought
by a family grieving the untimely death of their son. It is a free speech
case, testing the boundaries of the constitutional commitment to the marketplace of ideas. It is a religious liberty case that has made unlikely
* Associate Professor, Legal Research and Writing, Georgetown University Law
Center. J.D., Georgetown University Law Center; Ph.D., University of WisconsinMadison. Professor Shulman has written on Snyder v. Phelps for the Penn State Law Review. See Jeffrey Shulman, The Outrageous God: Emotional Distress, Tort Liability, and
the Limits of Religious Advocacy, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 381 (2008). He also wrote an
amicus brief on behalf of Albert Snyder. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Jeffrey I. Shulman
Supporting Appellee, Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2008) (No. 08-1026),
2008 WL 3460050.
1. Snyder v. Phelps, 2010 WL 757695 (U.S. March 08, 2010).
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allies of those on opposite sides of the political and cultural divides that
make our liberal democracy such a challenging enterprise.
The most common of legal commonplaces is that the First Amendment protects speech that some people—perhaps, most people—will find
offensive. Indeed, the protection of offensive speech is one of the great
hallmarks of our constitutional order, the stamp that establishes the genuineness and the generosity of our freedoms, including a longstanding
tradition of religious liberty. It is no surprise that our courts, by training
and instinct, want to protect the right to speak—and nowhere more so
than where speech is religiously motivated. It may be this very protectiveness that led the Fourth Circuit to make such a mess of things.
The basic facts of the case are clear enough. Marine Lance Corporal Matthew A. Snyder was killed in Iraq in the line of duty. His funeral,
held in Westminster, Maryland, was picketed by the Westboro Baptist
Church. The church held signs that read, “You are going to hell,” “God
hates you,” “Thank God for dead soldiers,” and “Semper fi fags.” Following the funeral, the church posted on its website (godhatesfags.com)
an “epic” entitled “The Burden of Marine Lance Cpl. Matthew Snyder.”
Matthew‟s burden, as the church saw it, was that he had been “raised for
the devil” and “taught to defy God.” Matthew‟s father, Albert Snyder,
brought a civil action against the Westboro Baptist Church in federal district court, asserting a claim for intentional infliction of mental and emotional distress (among other causes of action).2 He was awarded $10.9
million in compensatory and punitive damages.
That judgment was reversed by the Fourth Circuit.3 The court could
have avoided the constitutional question by holding that Mr. Snyder
failed to prove at trial sufficient evidence to support his tort claims.4 But
the court waded into murky doctrinal waters—and made them a whole
lot murkier.
The court reasoned that the church‟s speech was constitutionally
protected unless a reasonable person would understand it to be communicating objectively verifiable facts. There are, the court went on to say,
two categories of speech that cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating
actual facts about an individual. The first is statements of public concern

2. Snyder originally brought suit on five counts: defamation, intrusion upon seclusion, publicity given to private life, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil
conspiracy. Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567 (D. Md. 2008). The district court
granted defendants‟ motions for summary judgment on the claims for defamation and
publicity given to private life. Id. at 572-73. The court held, however, that the remaining
claims raised genuine issues of material fact. Id. at 573.
3. Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2008).
4. See id. at 227-33 (Shedd, J., concurring in the judgment).

2010]

WHEN IS RELIGIOUS SPEECH OUTRAGEOUS?

15

that fail to contain a provably false factual connotation. The second is
rhetorical statements employing loose, figurative, or hyperbolic language. These statements are categorically protected, regardless of the
plaintiff‟s status as a public or private figure.
Had the court gone no further, it would have generated confusion
enough for sorting out by the Supreme Court. To begin with, Mr. Snyder
was not making a defamation claim. So it is not clear why the dispositive question is whether the church‟s assertions were susceptible of being
proved true or false. Nor is it clear why, whether the claim is defamation
or emotional distress, the plaintiff‟s status as a private figure is irrelevant.
But the court gave short shrift to the complexities of the case law. It
did not matter whether the church‟s statements were of public concern
because they did not assert provable facts. They employed “hyperbolic
rhetoric” to spark debate. The court noted that some signs (those reading
“You‟re Going to Hell” and “God Hates You”) could be interpreted by a
reasonable reader as referring specifically to Matthew Snyder. No matter, because, as the court concluded, “[w]hether an individual is „Going
to Hell‟ or whether God approves of someone‟s character could not possibly be subject to objective verification.”5 With its single-minded focus
on the factualness of the church‟s claims (again, the wrong focus for an
emotional distress case), the court looked for contextual evidence that
would support its conclusion that no reasonable person could think the
church was asserting provable facts. Remarkably, it found that evidence
in the very outrageousness of the church‟s speech:
The general context of the speech in this proceeding is one of impassioned (and highly offensive) protest, with the speech at issue conveyed
on handheld placards. A distasteful protest sign regarding hotly debated matters of public concern, such as homosexuality or religion, is
not the medium through which a reasonable reader would expect a
speaker to communicate objectively verifiable facts. In addition, the
words on these signs were rude, figurative, and incapable of being objectively proven or disproven. Given the context and tenor of these two
signs, a reasonable reader would not interpret them as asserting actual
facts about either Snyder or his son. 6

5. Id. at 224.
6. Id. Similarly, the court concluded that “the written Epic published on the website of the Church is also protected by the First Amendment, in that a reasonable reader
would understand it to contain rhetorical hyperbole, and not actual, provable facts about
Snyder and his son.” See id.
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With perverse illogic, the Fourth Circuit has created a legal incentive for religious speakers to be especially abusive and inflammatory: by
its own calculus, the more “hyperbolic” the speech, the more it is constitutionally protected. But nothing in the law suggests that the First
Amendment requires courts to engage in such hermeneutic gymnastics.
What the Westboro Baptist Church wants is the right to make any
private individual the target of personal verbal assault about matters of
private concern—and to do so with complete immunity from the law.
The Supreme Court has said that speech about public officials or public
figures, or speech about matters of public concern, may be constitutionally protected, even if it causes emotional distress (though even these
forms of speech do not get absolute protection). But the Court has never
held that the First Amendment protects personal invective “delivered in
the milieu of religious practice.”7
This case tests the proposition stated in Cantwell v. Connecticut that
“[r]esort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution.”8 If
the speech at question here was directed toward a private person and was
not a matter of public concern—if, in other words, this case is about
mere personal invective—there is no reason to grant the church constitutional protection.9 If the church‟s speech was targeted toward a most
7. Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544, 559 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
8. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-10 (1940). See id. at 309 (“One
may, however, be guilty of [breach of the peace] if he commit acts or make statements
likely to provoke violence and disturbance of good order, even though no such eventuality be intended. Decisions to this effect are many, but examination discloses that, in practically all, the provocative language which was held to amount to a breach of the peace
consisted of profane, indecent, or abusive remarks directed to the person of the hearer.”)
(emphasis added); cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (“While the four-letter
word displayed by Cohen in relation to the draft is not uncommonly employed in a personally provocative fashion, in this instance it was clearly not „directed to the person of
the hearer.‟”) (quoting Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 309).
9. The district court concluded that it was Defendants who thrust the Snyder family
into the unwelcome glare of national media coverage, “transform[ing] a private funeral
into a public event.” Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 577 (D. Md. 2008). The
fact that Matthew‟s funeral attracted public attention does not make him a public figure.
“A private individual is not automatically transformed into a public figure just by becoming involved in or associated with a matter that attracts public attention.” Wolston v.
Reader‟s Digest Ass‟n, 443 U.S. 157, 167 (1979). Defendants‟ reasoning would in effect
nullify the Supreme Court‟s precedents that establish the contours of the public figure
doctrine. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323 (1974); cf. St. Luke Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Smith, 537 A.2d 1196,
1202-04 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988) (plaintiffs objection to pastor at church meeting does
not render her a public figure) (citing Gertz and Firestone). If there is no evidence that
Matthew or his family assumed a prominent role in public controversy, see Gertz., 418
U.S. at 351, or that the Snyders sought to use Matthew‟s funeral “as a fulcrum to create
public discussion,” see Wolston, 443 U.S. at 168, the district court rightly rejected Defen-
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unwilling listener, one who was held captive by special circumstances,
there is even more reason why the church should be adjudged to have
forfeited any claim to constitutional immunity from tort suit. 10
Tort liability subjects religious entities to neutral and generally applicable principles of tort law. If the church‟s religious advocacy
amounts to tortious conduct, it would be subject to suit, as would any
other religious, or non-religious, group. But tort liability places no special burden on religious entities. Nor does the resolution of tort disputes
necessarily involve any intermeddling in internal church affairs.11 If anything, the Fourth Circuit treads on dangerous ground when it concludes
that the church does not literally mean what it says. Because it focused
on the factualness, and not the hurtfulness, of the church‟s statements,
the court dismissed those statements as figurative and irreverent. That is
an odd judgment. Certainly, the Westboro Baptist Church does not think
its speech was mere rhetorical overkill. Irreverent? As distasteful as the
church‟s language might be to others, its message is the heart—and, I
suppose, the soul—of the church. This is a church that finds reverence in
outrageousness.
Personally abusive speech directed toward a private target held hostage by special circumstances—this is not the type of speech that has merited immunity from tort liability. To find that such speech is constitutionally protected would not foster the robust debate sought by the
Fourth Circuit. Rather, by protecting the personal vilification of private
individuals, such immunity would work against a civic order where all

dants‟ attempt to “bootstrap their position by arguing that Matthew Snyder was a public
figure,” Snyder, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 577.
10. When speech is forced upon “an audience incapable of declining to receive it,”
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 307 (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring),
the Court has not hesitated to uphold the regulation of expressive activity. See Hill v.
Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000); Madsen v. Women‟s Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753 (1994);
Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988); F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978);
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974); Rowan v. United States Post
Office Dep‟t, 397 U.S. 728 (1970); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Packer Corp.
v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932); cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (persons
confronted with defendant‟s jacket bearing the words “Fuck the Draft” could have
avoided “further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes”); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1207 (7th Cir. 1978) (residents could “simply avoid” Naziaffiliated party protest activities). If there are places outside the home where we need not
be held hostage to verbal confrontation, the setting where we mourn the dead certainly
must be one of them.
11. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 606 (1979); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976); Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem‟l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952); Gonzalez v.
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1929).
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people are equally free to express their deepest beliefs. That freedom,
like all freedoms, has it limits. In granting certiorari in Snyder v. Phelps,
the Supreme Court may help us better understand the limits of religious
advocacy.

